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THOUSANDS OF 'B' TAPOLS WILL REMAIN AFTER 1979 
KOPKAMTIB DECEPTION EXPOSED 
Thousands of B-category political prisoners will remain in 
detention after the completion of the Indonesian Govern-
ment's release plan, despite repeated pledges that all would 
be freed by the time the plan is fully implemented at the 
end of 1979. This is abundantly clear from the figures made 
public recently regarding the releases scheduled to take 
place this year. 
On 27 April, KOPKAMTIB announced the release of 1,259 
B-category tapols. This is the first of four waves of releases 
to take place this year. After the completion of these 
releases, KOPKAMTIB claims, there will be no more 
untried (B-category) prisoners in detention, only those who 
have been convicted in courts oflaw. 
Close scrutiny of KOPKAMTIB figures reveal however 
that, even if one accepts the validity of KOPKAMTIB 
figures since the end of last year, this claim cannot possibly 
be true. According to the KOPKAMTIB announcement in 
April, the total number of B category tapols to be released 
this year will amount to 9,562. The releases will take place 
as follows: 
April 
September 
November 
December 
1,259 
4,000 
1,920 
2,383 
The 8,303 tapols still due for release this year consist of the 
following categories, again according to the KOPKAMTIB 
announcement: 
'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan 
politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely 
used although it was banned in 1974 because the 
military authorities said that all prisoners are 
'criminals'. 
B-category 
A-category 
Y-category* 
Total** 
7,618 
527 
258 
8,403 
Yet at the end of 1978, after all the 1978 rel~ases had been 
completed, KOPKAMTIB's figures were as follows: 
B-category 9,739 
A-category 1,391 
X-category*** 758 
Y-category 258 
The total number of B-category tapols due for release this 
year should be higher than last year's final B-category total 
for the following reasons. The number now given for the 
A-category has fallen by 864 and according to KOPKAM-
continued on p.2 
* Y-category consists of prisoners who have been recently arrested, 
and not yet classified. 
**There is an unexplained discrepancy of 100 between the Septem-
ber + November + December total and the total of the figures given 
for the three categories. 
*** X-category prisoners are those who were arrested shortly after 
the 1965 coup, and who still await classification. 
STUDENTS: UP TO 9-YEAR SENTENCES DEMANDED 
Sentences ranging from four to nine years have been 
demanded by the prosecution in the student trials taking 
place in Bandung and Jakarta. 36 student leaders are on 
trial in seven cities for "insulting the President" when they 
criticised corruption and economic policies and urged 
President Suharto not to seek re-election in 1978. 
A sentence of 9 years has been demanded for Herry 
Akhmadi, Chairmm of the Bandung Institute of Techno-
logy Stl.ldent Council which authorised publication of the 
White Book. Other sentence demands are: Iskadir Chotib, 
8 years; Drs A. R. Noor, 7 years; A. Tarsono, 6 years, 
Lala Mustafa, 5~ years; Rosmel Jalil, 5 years; and 
lndratjahaya Kadi, 4 years. 
For more details please turn to pages 6-9. 
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TIB, all A-category tapols (those awaiting trial) who cannot 
after all be tried will be re-classified as Bs. And what has 
happened to the X-category , those who, we were previously 
told , were awaiting classification? All last year's X-category 
prisoners should surely now be swelling the ranks of the Bs 
(or the As?). 
For KOPKAMTIB to keep its promise to release all un-
tried prisoners by the end of this year, it should release the 
following: 
Last year's B-category total 
Reclassified As 
Xs and Ys 
Total 
9,739 
864 
1,016 
11,619 
The official figures are further confused by the fact that 
KOPKAMTIB's total of 8,303 (or 8,403) to be released this 
year includes the A-category tapols who are supposed to be 
the ones still awaiting trial. Are we to assume that no 
further trials will take place? This is not what General Yoga 
Sugama, KOPKAMTIB's Chief-of-Staff told the press at the 
release ceremony of 144 tapols in Pontianak, West Kali-
mantan on 27 April , namely that "all A-category prisoners' 
cases would be settled through the courts" (Kompas, 
28 April, 1979) though he did add, neatly contradicting 
himself, that "those whose cases could not be settled 
through the courts would be re-classified". 
FEER: "Obfuscation on Numbers" 
David Jenkins writes that "there is mounting concern that 
the country could have as many as 2 ,500 still in detention 
when the much-vaunted release programme winds up on 
December 31 ". (Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 May, 
1979 .) Recalling the remark made in 1972 by Indonesia's 
Attorney-General of the time , General Sugih Arto, that it is 
"impossible to say exactly how many political prisoners 
there are . It is a floating rate , like the Japanese yen vis-a-vis 
the dollar", Jenkins writes: 
Today Indonesian officials seem to take the issue more 
seriously, if only because it has attracted so much out-
side criticism. But they seem no more able than the 
former attorney-general to say just how many detainees 
the government is holding. And obfuscation on the ques-
tion of numbers is causing increasing concern to Western 
diplomats who monitor prisoner releases. 
But the figure of 2,500 given by David Jenkins is correct 
only insofar as it summarises the inconsistencies of KOP-
KAMTIB's figures . If the 1979 figures are now clearly 
shown to be wrong, why accept that the end-1978 figures 
were accurate? In fact, the contradiction that has now 
become so apparent can only confirm the fears many ob-
servers have had for so long that it is impossible to trust 
any of the figures KOPKAMTIB has been using since it first 
announced the release plan three years ago. 
A former army officer, Achmad Zein, in an emotional reunion with his family, at the release ceremony in West Kalimantan. 
General Yoga Sugama, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff, looks on: (KOMPAS 28 April 1979) 
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BURU AND SAVANA JAYA 
7 DEAD, A THOUSAND FORCED SETTLERS 
Seven ta pols have died on Buru since last December. This 
was stated by KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff, General Yoga 
Sugama, at a release ceremony in Pontianak, West Kali-
mantan, when he was giving overall figures for the number 
of tapols now in detention. APP reports (28 April, 1979) 
that he refused to reveal the causes of these deaths. The 
number of tapols now on Buru is said to be 5 ,920. 
The General expressed regrets that so few Buru Prisoners 
had opted to remain on the island. He said that 285 would 
be remaining , including "207 former detainees (who) are 
ready to be settled on the island" (Indonesian Times, 
28 April, 1979). 
The 207 clearly refers to the tapols who were joined by 
their families and have been forced to remain at the Savana 
Jaya unit (although formally released last November, see 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 33) because they are required to pay 
their own fares home. With each family consisting on an 
average of five persons, at least one thousand persons are 
involved. 
A contact who has just spent six months in Indonesia, 
and had extensive opportunities to speak with released 
prisoners from Buru and elsewhere, writes : 
"The 207 tapols who have supposedly become volun-
tary transmigrants are the ones who allowed their 
families to join them. They thought at the time that this 
would be the only chance they would ever have of being 
re-united with their families because it was being said 
that all the tapols would remain permanently on Buru. 
The men therefore signed statements that they were 
willing to remain there permanently with their families . 
''When the wives arrived, they realised that they had 
been deceived. They were looked upon and treated like 
co-prisoners; they were not permitted to leave the camp 
and had to hand over any money they had . Then, at the 
end of 1977, they saw a large number of ta pols being 
released who were allowed to return to Java, yet they 
with their husbands were required to remain on the 
island . 
"Under pressure from a women's demonstration , 
Attorney-General Ali Said conceded in a press con-
ference on 13 December that the families in Savar1:i 
Jaya want to return to Java. ''We can't prevent them, for 
they are homesick ." But, he added, it was awful to think 
of the money that would be lost if all the tapols left ; all 
the investments made would be wasted. The auth9rities 
had therefore decided that consent would only be given 
for the families to return home if they paid their own 
fares. 
"This requirement has not been imposed on other 
tapols. It means that the families have not been able to 
leave for financial reasons." 
From another source it has been learnt that the Savana Jaya 
families are destitute . Just before their release , when they 
thought that they would be going home , they sold their 
household goods. So , when they were told they would not 
be going home, they had nothing at all and would have to 
wait for another harvest before they could re-equip them-
selves with anything. 
Life Sentence 
The Bali District Court passed life sentence on · Pujo 
Prasetyo on 9 April, 1979. The defendant who was des-
cribed as a "PKI cadre" was found guilty of subversion and 
of having "actively helped to overthrow the lawful Indo-
nesian Government through the G30S". 
The prosecution claimed that Pujo Prasetyo had atten-
ded a PKI cadre course from May to September, 1965 and 
when he returned to Bali , had passed on information about 
the "Council of Generals". He was accused furthermore of 
having made preparations with other PKI leaders in Bali to 
"welcome the G30S ... including mobilising troops to take 
over important installations". 
No report has been received about the defence or about 
whether the convicted man would aypeal against sentence . 
Solo, Central Java, 18th Decem-
ber 1978: A family which had 
come to meet a Buru tapol who 
did not turn up. 
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AT LEAST 1,000 T APO LS IN KALIMA NT AN CAMPS 
A recent report in the Indonesian newspaper, Kompas (28 
April 1979) has revealed that a considerable number of 
'released' prisoners are being moved to Kalimantan 're-
settlement camps' which are exclusively for ex-tapols. Some 
435 former tapols are reported to have been moved to 
camps at Amborawang, Berau (East Kalimantan), Buntok 
and Jilitan (South Central Kalimantan). Again reports from 
isolated West Kalimantan indicate that another 200 have 
been settled in a camp at Ketapang; add to this another 355 
who were expected to settle at Pararapak camp and 1 SO in 
Danau Jutuh (Tempo, 23 December 1978) in the South 
Barito region, and the figure is at least 1,000. * 
The government has made several assertions that the 
prisoners have gone voluntarily to these camps. However 
there are a number of disquieting aspects of these trans-
ferrals which have been raised by a number of press reports 
in the last two years, and perhaps most disturbing of all is 
the apparent connection of some of the unsavoury aspects 
of these "free" settlements with companies engaged in 
timber exploitation in the area, usually foreign-owned 
companies, with minority holdings by Indonesian interests. 
Kalimantan, formerly known as Borneo, has proved a 
rich source of revenue to these concerns, The island is 
sparsely populated and undeveloped, and local officials and 
company personnel operate to a large extent free of central 
government control. Timber operations in the interior of 
the island have forced many of the original inhabitants, the 
Dayaks, away from their traditional lands, and into shanty 
towns, while company operations have considerably dis-
turbed the ecological balance of the island (see 
''Weyerhauser in Indonesia", Pacific Research, XI No. 1, 
November-December 1977). 
At least two of the resettlement camps, Amborawang 
and Pararapak are conveniently situated within the boun-
daries of concessions owned by the companies Inhutani and 
Barito Baru respectively. This fact alone raises the proba-
* Allowance must be made for po~ible overlapping of figures as 
'Buntok' and 'Pararapak' may be referring to the same camp. 
bility of "settlers" in these camps being used as labour for 
the companies, as it seems unlikely that the companies 
would add to their expenses by importing more labour to 
these remote areas, and providing them with housing, when 
a captive labour force (in the true sense of the word) 
already exists. The Amborawang complex was built under 
military supervision by forced prisoner labour some months 
before the 1977 'releases' occurred, and it is clearly in-
tended to assist forestry operations. Evidence from a 
variety of reports indicates that the government used the 
prisoners to clear virgin forest, to provide infrastructure, to 
grow vegetables and to provide labour for these projects. 
Again, a letter sent to TAPOL from Kalimantan (see 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 24, October 1977) states that the 
inhabitants of Amborawang were being used as labour for 
local military authorities who had concluded deals to 
supply timber sleepers to the state railway company 
(PKNA) and also with a Taiwanese timber company. 
A Kompas report (30 November 1977) indicates that the 
attitudes of local authorities are unequivocal in seeing the 
'former' prisoners as a resource to be exploited for their 
local development projects, which in many cases support 
the timber operations, so that their development contri-
bution to the area and its inhabitants is questionable. The 
military commander of East Kalimantan has fulsomely 
described the Amborawang project as "a beach-head for 
regional development". David Jenkins of the Far Eastern 
Economic Review (28 October, 1977) reports that it is 
hoped that the settlem~nt .will eventually support 5 ,000 to 
6,000 people, giving some idea of the extent to which the 
authorities intend to use ex-tapols in development plans. 
The Pararapak camp has been described as the 'launching 
pad for the .South Barito regional development'. The Bupati 
of this region has expressed his hope that the imported 
former tapols will contribute by supplying the towns with 
fresh vegetables, as it is well known that Kalimantan towns 
are considered- the mo st expensive in Indonesia, owing to a 
heavy r~liance on imported foods (Sinar Harapan, 21 Sept-
ember, 1977). 
A tapol named Wongso photo-
graphed against the background 
of the site of the Amborawang 
camp. Jungle clearance for prison-
ers' homes was carried out by 350 
tapols. (Kompas, 30 November 
1978) 
4 TAPOL Bulletin No 34 June 1979 
Several measures have been taken by the government to 
ensure that the projects will succeed. First of all a commit-
ment to go to the camps is required . Some of the prisoners 
were moved to the camps before they were 'released', and 
having spent a lot of labour in the projects , they no doubt 
felt some incentive to stay. The outside world for many 
tapols , many of whom are ethnic Chinese, has not been 
particularly welcoming, as many remember the serious 
racial tensions of the 1960s. In West Kalirnantan, the 
government has manipulated the situation by urging the 
local Dyak population to occupy land formerly held by 
Chinese prisoners, a move which would have the dual 
advantage of defusing the complaints of Dyaks, whose way 
of life has been disrupted by timber operations, and giving 
the former tapols little choice of livelihood after their 
'release'. The questionable design of the resettlement pro-
gramme is underscored by a Kompas report (20 June 1977) 
which observes that only young and fit prisoners are 
selected for the Buntok camp. They may not be joined by 
their families until the camp can support them. The same 
condition is made for the 355 settlers at the Pararapak 
camp , while the elderly and sick are sent back to their 
home villages to be supported by their relatives-if they are 
lucky enough to have any. At least some international ob-
servers have not been deceived about the real nature of 
these camps. The International Labour Organisation notes 
in its Report of the Committee of Experts on the Appli-
cation of Conventions and Recommendations (1979, p. 82) 
that the Indonesian government has been asked in 1978 to 
supply "copies of the rules governing participation in re-
settlement schemes, including more particularly the 
conditions under which persons taking part in resettlement 
projects may terminate such participation" (our emphasis 
-Ed.) The report states that the Indonesian government 
asserted to the Conference Committee in 1978 that the 
"release of detainees was absolute and unconditional" (sic) 
but that it had failed to supply the information requested. 
Finally, efforts are made to ensure that former ta pols 
Tapols at the 'Pancasila Village' 
camp, near Buntok, South Barito, 
receiving orders for the day 's 
work at the morning roll-call. 
(Sinor Harapan, 21 or 22 Septem-
ber 1977) 
will have the correct mentality for their hard working 
future. The Pararapak camp has become known as the 
"Pancasila Camp" because of its ideological efforts . Forty 
prisoners, the "pioneers" of Pararapak, underwent special 
training, and were only moved to embark on their pio-
neering activities after they had passed psycho-tests 
(Kompas 26 June 1977). The article described Pararapak as 
a ''mini-Buru"! A further precaution in the area of ideolo-
gical purity has been taken in at least the case ·of the 
Amborawang camp where settlers are isolated from. the 
local population , who need special permits to enter the 
camp area (Tempo 24 December , 1977). 
If development as defined by the government is realised, 
the government will receive a very high return for a low 
investment . Kompas (30 November 1977) reports for 
example that KOPKAMTIB allocated a mere Rp 34 million 
(US S90,000) for the establishment of the Amborawang 
project. The money was expected to house 900 former 
tapols and their families (some 3,600 persons) and to cover 
their needs until the first harvest , eight months away. 
Obviously S25 per head for this period is hopelessly 
inadequate. 
All these developments over the last two years give some 
insight into the future fate of 'released' tapols. There is 
good reason to fear that in many ways their freedom will be 
severely curtailed , not only by the restraints of poverty, 
but by official plans to feed 'development' projects with a 
cheap, captive and compliant labour force. Timber as 
Indonesia's second most important export has made the 
needs of the timber companies a paramount concern in 
Kalirnantan. Timber companies are known to grossly 
exploit their workers, and to resort to extreme measures of 
military intimidation against the expression of workers' 
grievances (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 32, February 1979). 
The companies have found that it is very effective to accuse 
recalcitrant workers of PKI links, a charge which has been 
amply proved to carry virtually unlimited punishment. The 
ex-tapols, working under close military supervision, are 
exceptionally vulnerable to this kind of threat . 
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INDICTMENT OF DOODY CHUSNIATI SURIADIREDJA 
The following summary of the Indictment of one of the student 
defendants, Daddy Ch. Suriadiredja, who w~s Vice-Chairman of the 
Student Council of the University of Indonesia (Jakarta), is published to 
give our readers an idea of the "crimes"with which the student leaders are 
being charged. 
The First Charge 
. . . that he showed "deliberate disrespect for the President 
or the Vice-President" (Article 134 of the Criminal Code/ 
KUHP) and "disseminated, displayed or pasted up writings 
or photographs which are offensive to the President or the 
Vice-President with the intention of making these offensive 
things known to the public". (Article 137) 
Primary 
* ... that he did deliberately insult the President ... by 
saying that the President had: 
deviated from implementation of the 1945 Consti-
tution and the Pancasila; 
emasculated the Legislature; 
belittled the status of the People's Consultative Con-
gress (MPR) by merging its leadership with that of 
Parliament which resulted in placing the MPR on a 
level with the President and Parliament, 
committed deception in the procedure of appointing 
members of Parliament and the Congress; 
based his actions on personal interests and the 
interests of certain groups; 
appointed regional leading officials without regard for 
the aspirations and opinions of people in the regions 
in question. 
The full text of this was contained in the Indonesian 
Students' Pledge (Ikrar) and the Decision Resulting from 
the Meeting of Student Councils/Senates of Indonesia 
held in Bandung from 24-27 October, 1977. 
* ... that he received a mandate ... to represent the Stu-
dent Council of the University of Indonesia to attend 
(the above) meeting ... 
* ... that he participated in the said meeting and made 
proposals as well as signed the products of the said 
meeting ... 
* ... that he undertook a series of actions ... (to) follow 
up the above activities, among others: 
... reported the results of the meeting to the person 
from whom he had received his mandate, namely 
Lukman Hakim (Chairman of the Student Council, 
UI); 
... was present at the Bogor Darmaga together with 
Lukman Hakim (et al) at which discussions were held 
about political, economic, social and cultural 
problems which, so it was said by the accused and his 
colleagues, represented the failures or unsuccessful 
measures of President Suharto during his period of 
office, as a result of which it was decided to hold a 
meeting with President Suharto and press him to 
refrain from nominating himself as President ... 
... attended a meeting ... at Kuningan on 5 and 6 
January 1978, together with Student Councils/ 
Senates from all parts of Indonesia (organisations 
listed) (which) gave birth to a Charter/Consequences 
which reads as follows: 
That Indonesian students as one of the components 
inheriting the future of the nation and motherland 
remain forever ponsistent in facing all eventualities 
which may happen in this country. 
... on 7 January, together with (Student Council/ 
Senate representatives) visited the Parliament/MPR 
building or at the very least a public place or a place 
which could be attended by the public, to submit the 
Ikrar and Charter/Consequences to the Chairman of 
Parliament/MPR ... 
... on 15 January 1978, had a meeting with members 
of the executive of the Student Council of the Ul ... 
and drew up a document entitled, "Basis for the Stu-
dent Struggle and Our Resolve" ... which was dis-
seminated to students of the University and was also 
read out at a meeting of the Student Council and 
students of UI. .. 
... accused undertook these criminal acts knowing or 
being in a position to have known that these criminal 
actions would obstruct implementation of the govern-
ment's programme ... 
Subsidiary: 
* That he, personally and as Deputy-Chairman of the Stu-
dent Council of the UI, both alone and together with 
colleagues ... disseminated writings containing insults of 
the President in order to ensure that the insulting con-
tents would be known to or would be more widely 
known to the public ... 
... and that he supplied news that was uncertain, exag-
gerated or incomplete whereas he understood or at the 
very least should have been able to realise that this news 
would or could arouse disturbances among the people ... 
The Second Charge 
* ... that he ... "deliberately in public, verbally or in 
writing insulted one of the Supreme Councils of the 
State of Indonesia" (Article 207 of the Criminal Code/ 
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KUHP), namely the Indonesian Parliament., in the 
following ways: 
Primary: 
* ... that he discussed (with Lukman Hakim and others) 
a visit made by students (from Jogjakarta) to the Chief-
of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB; 
* ... that he and his colleagues went . . . to meet Farid 
Rasyid at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture Hostel to 
learn about (the above visit) ... and discussed various 
questions among others a Farewell Meeting of Members 
of Parliament ... and concluded that: 
. . . the Parliament elected in 1971 had been dis-
banded; 
... a vacuum now existed in the Indonesian Legis-
lature; 
... it was therefore necessary to establish a Legis-
lative Assembly. The accused and colleagues agreed, 
without having the right thereto, to set up a Provi-
sional Parliament (but) did not ask the Leadership of 
the 1971 Parliament whether it was true that the 
1971 Parliament had been disbanded ... 
* ... the accused and colleagues drafted the September 
Proclamation of the Provisional Parliament, and drafted 
an Agenda of Activities of the Provisional Parliament ... 
* On 13 September, 1977, the accused and his colleagues, 
in front of the Parliament Building proclaimed ... the 
establishment of the Provisional Parliament in the 
presence of journalists ... and some security officers as 
well as one foreigner by reading out the September Pro-
clamation and Agenda of Activities, which documents 
were then distributed to those present; 
* ... then held a press conference at which he and his 
colleagues said that the said Provisional Parliament had 
been set up to fill the vacuum ... because the 1971 
Parliament had been disbanded and to avoid.creating the 
impression that Indonesia was a totalitarian state ... 
* On 17 September ... in implementing the Agenda of 
Activities ... held a hearing/exchange of opinions with 
the chairman of the Legal Aid Bureau, Adnan Buyung 
Nasution, regarding basic human rights and the anti-
subversion law. 
Subsidiary: 
* ... that he did disseminate a writing containing insults 
of the Indonesian Parliament with the purpose of en-
suring that this insult would be known or would be more 
widely known to the public ... 
-~ "That's not allowed, either!" 
Published in Derita Pengadilan Mahasiswa (Studellt Trials Bulletin) No.21, 1979. 
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THE STUDENTS ON TRIAL 
Jakarta 
Lukman Hakim Chairman of the Student Council of the 
University of Indonesia (Jakarta) 1977 /78. He is a fifth-
year student of the Faculty of Pharmacy. He urged the 
court to drop all the charges against his two comrades-in-
arms, Doddy Ch. Suriadiredja and Ibrahim Kahir, .Vice-
Chairman of the Council, as he, the chairman, took full 
responsibility for the actions of the Council. An English 
translation of his excepsi is published in US TAPOL 
Bulletin, Vol. 18/19, April/May 1979. 
Doddy Chusniati Suriadiredja Vice-Chairman of the 
Student Council of the University of Indonesia. He is a 
fifth-year student of the Faculty of Medicine. 
An outline of the prosecutor's indictment is given on page 
Ibrahim Zakir Vice-Chairman of the St'udent Council of the 
University of Indonesia. He is a fifth-year student of poli-
tical science at the Faculty of Social Science. He fell ill 
just prior to the trial. 
Hudori Hamid Chairman of the Student Council of the 
Institute of Paedagogy, Jakarta. 
Haryono S. Jusuf General Secretary of the Student Council 
of the State Islamic University. He represented the Council 
at the meeting of Student Councils and Senates in Bandung, 
25-27 October, 1977. 
Nizar Dahlan In court, he withdrew everything.he had said 
during preliminary interrogations as these had taken place 
under threat, and to the accompaniment of beatings. 
Nazmi Ali lmran He is co-defendant with Nizar Dahlan. He 
too insisted on withdrawing statements made during pre-
trial interrogations as these had been made under duress 
and to the accompaniment of beatings. 
Rosmel Jalil Together with his co-defendant (see below), he 
told the court of torture inflicted during pre-trial interro-
gations and asked that the man responsible, by the name of 
Mangunsong, be summoned to court to answer for this 
treatment. His defence lawyers asked for top members oi 
government to appear as witnesses, including President 
Suharto, Vice-President Adam Malik (who had told student 
delegates that their actions were "proper"), Admiral 
Sudomo, Daryotmo, chairman of Parliament and others. 
This request was rejeeted by the court. 
lndratjahaya Kadi A co-defendant with Rosmen Jalil. 
Bandung 
Heri Akhmadi As Chairman of the Student Council of the 
Bandung Institute of Technology (BIT), he signed the 
White Book of the Student Movement, published as a state-
ment of the BIT Student Council. The White Book was 
immediately banned, and the arrest of student leaders 
quickly followed. An English translation of his excepsi is 
published in full in US TAPOL Bulletin, Vol. 18/19, April/ 
May, 1979. 
Josef Manurung, Abdul Rochim, Rizal Ramli and Irzadi 
Mirwan, four BIT students who were appointed by the BIT 
~tudent Council to draft the White Book. Jrzadi Mirwan is 
in detention because he went into hiding in late 1978 in-
stead of responding to a summons from the authorities, 
saying he would only give himself up if he could be assured 
that a trial would take place. He did so after the first 
Bandung trial commenced, and was placed into custody in 
Sukamiskin Prison, a prison for convicted criminals. 
Ramies Manampung Silalahi Chairman of the Information 
Department of the BIT Student Council. He organised the 
meeting in Bandung of Student Councils and Senates in late 
October 1977, and was elected chairman of the Implemen-
tation Committee set up to follow through the meeting's 
decisions. · 
Iskadir Chotib Chairman of the Student Council of 
:f>ajajaran State University, Bandung. His child died during 
the early days of the trial. 
A. Tarsono Chairman of the Student Council of the 
Nusantara Islamic University, Bandung. 
Teuku Iskandar Member and General Assistant of the Stu-
dent Council of the National Academy of Technology, 
Bandung. 
Lala Mustafa Chairman of the Student Council of the Is-
lamic University of Bandung. 
Sukmaji Indro Tjahyono Chairman of the Caretaker Presi-
dium of the BIT Student Council in 1977. His excepsi, 
delivered at the beginning of the trial, was published in 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 33, April 1979. 
lwan Mucipto Chairman of the Student Council of Para-
hiyangan University, Bandung. 
Mohamad Iqbal Member of the Caretaker Presidium of the 
BIT Student Council. He has testified as a witness in several 
other cases, althouugh no reports have yet been received 
about his own trial. He was listed as a defendant in the first 
list received by T APOL. He is being held in custody for the 
same reason as Irzadi Mirwan (see above). 
Al Bilal Also a member of the Caretaker Presidium of the 
BIT Student Council, 1977. He is a student of the Petro-
leum Technology Faculty of BIT. He is said to have been 
responsible for arranging the meeting-place and other 
facilities for the October 1977 meeting of Student Councils 
and Senates in Bandung. He is being held in custody for the 
same reason as Irzadi Mirwan (see above). 
Drs. A. H. Noor He was Chairman of the Student Council 
of the Institute of Paedagogy from 197 S to 1977. Already 
graduated, he is on trial for having been moderator on the 
first day of the October 1977 Meeting of Student Councils 
and .Senates in Bandung, when outside panelists spoke, in-
cludmg General Nasution. 
Surabaya, East Java 
Mohamad Sholeh General Secretary of the Student Council 
of the Surabaya Institute of Technology. He is also in 
custody. 
continued on p.17 
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DEFENCE PROTESTS TO SUPREME COURT 
Adnan Buyung Nasution and Hotma Sitompoel, the Chair-
man and Secretary of the Central Co-ordinators' Team for 
the Defence of Indonesian Students, have protested 
strongly to the Chairman of the Supreme Court against 
abuse of the fundamental rights of student defendants 
facing trial in all parts of Indonesia and particularly at the 
Bandung District Court. The protest which was dated 25 
April deals with the following points: 
1. Defendants were not given the chance to query things 
they did not understand in the indictment, or, if given the 
chance, the Prosecution did not reply or the judge inter-
rupted the defendant. 
This is in contravention of Law No. 14, 1970 which 
protects basic human rights within the courts in conformity 
with the spirit of the 1945 (Indonesian) Constitution, and 
also violates Articles 268 and 272 of the Revised Procedural 
Code (HlR). 
2. The excepsil of the defence lawyers and the defendants 
were left virtually unanswered by the Prosecutor. Even 
before the excepsis had been read out, the Prosecutor was 
ready with his written reply, turning the whole thing into 
a farce. Or, the defence was not allowed to reply to the Pro-
secutor's response. 
3a. One defendant, Heri Achmadi, was not given the oppor-
tunity to explain the substance of the case properly and to 
deal with the reasoning and evidence contained in the 
indictment because he was only permitted to answer "Yes" 
or "No". Any explanations were always interrupted by the 
Court or the Prosecutor. This restricted the right of the de-
fendant to offer evidence in his own defence, in violation of 
Articles 287 and 289 of the Revised Procedural Code re-
garding the duty of the Court to examine the defendant. 
3b. Evidence presented by the Prosecutor was in conflict 
with provisions of the law. For instance, the interrogation 
of a witness was drawn up by the LAKSUSDA (regional 
military officer) who has no standing as a "help-magistrate" 
in the meaning of the law, and the witness did not appear in 
court. Such evidence was accepted by the Court despite 
objections from the defence. Furthermore, personal state-
ments by officials of the Governor's office and the Police 
Force were accepted by the Court as evidence whereas the 
defendant and his lawyers were not given the opportunity 
to submit evidence. 
3c. Defence witnesses and expert witnesses requested by 
the defence were categorically rejected by the Court 
without convincing reasons, thus reducing, restricting and 
even eliminating the right of the defendant to defend him-
self in an appropriate manner. 
3d. The defendant and his lawyers were not given the 
opportunity to object to these abuses. 
3e. The defendant, Heri Achrnadi, was not examined. The 
Court first examined the prosecution witnesses and when 
the Prosecution had no further witnesses to call and the 
defence and expert witnesses had been rejected, the hearing 
was immediately adjourned to hear the Prosecutor's final 
statement and demand (requisitoir). Although the defend-
ant had not been questioned and was not given the final 
word, the hearing was simply adjourned without hearing 
the objections of the defendant and his lawyers. How can 
the Prosecutor possibly make his demands (requisitoir) 
without first examining the defendant? (Their emphasis) 
4. The press was prohibited from or restricted in its re-
porting of the hearings on instructions from the Executive, 
which is an act of interference from the Executive. The 
courts were guarded and the public was prohibited from 
attending except with permits from the "security"' section. 
This is in contravention of the principle of the indepen-
dence of the courts, the prohibition against interference 
from the Executive and the public nature of trials. 
Finally, the two signatories stated that they would be 
submitting a more detailed list of violations perpetrated 
during the student trials. 
1. excepsi: a statement submitted by the Defence aftet"the indict-
ment has been read out. It gives the Defence the opportunity to 
challenge the legality of the indictment, the court and other aspects 
of the trial. 
Mohamad Sholeh, Surabaya 
student defendant, enters the 
court-room, with Army officers 
on each side. (Merdeka, 1st 
February 1979) 
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I Is a political prisoner who has been released by the 
Government truly free in the fonnal juridical meaning 
of the word? 
At the time of their release each political prisoner who 
is accused of being involved in the Movement of 30th 
September 1965 (hence forth referred to as tapols) receives 
from the Government : 
1. an order for change of his status or detention; 
2. a certificate of release , 
3. a pledge which must be recited and signed. 
If we examine the order carefully , it can be seen that the 
words "free'', "released" or "release" are not to be found, 
only the words 1) "change of status of detention of the 
detainees of G30S/PKI from full detention to return to 
society" 2) "implements the change of status of detention 
from full detention to return to society" 3) "he is obliged 
to present himself for examination if necessary. (Emphasis 
by the writer .. ) 
Therefore according to the order for tapols who have 
been "released" they have the status of being returned to 
society, not of being free in the formal juridical meaning of 
the word. The Government and officials generally talk 
about release and almost always write about "return to 
society", Tapols and former ta pols always talk about 
release and never talk about "return to society". Foreign 
radio broadcasts always talk about release and never about 
return to society. But in practice the Government and 
its officials do not treat former tapols as people who are 
free. The proof: at the time of ''release'', tapols receive the 
following instructions from officials: 
1. If a former ta pol wants to go outside his region he must 
fust obtain a travel permit from the Kodim (the mili-
tary authority); after arriving at his destination, he must 
report to the Kodim of the region of his destination. 
2. If a former tapol wants to move to another region, he 
must first request a removal permit from the Kodim 
(Kodam) of the region where he resides . In addition, he 
must produce a certificate from the person who will 
receive him in the region where he will reside. Once he 
has settled in the new area, he must report to the local 
Kodim {Kodam). 
Besides this, there is the following regulation. Every 
member of the population has to have an identity card. 
Identity cards for former tapols are given a code such as 
ET* or some other code. This means that a distinction is 
made between former tapols and other members of the 
population. This kind of discrimination was practised 
against the Jews in Germany during the Hitler regime . 
It should be added that sometimes former tapols are 
summoned by the military authority to be given certain 
instructions such as : 
1. not to write books or write in newspapers and magazines; 
2. not to speak in public ; 
3. not to join a mass or political organisation; 
4. not to go abroad ; 
*ET stands for eks-tapol (ex-political prisoner). 
THE FATE OF A TAPOl 
During a visit to Jakarta in May by l ~ 
an ex-tapol sent him a letter dra1-1 :~ 
"released" political prisoners. The ,i: 
attachments which we publish below,d~ 
newspaper Trouw on 26 May, 1979. 
THE RELEASE OATH 
(All tapols must take this oath before release.) 
Operational Command for the Restoration of 
Security and Order 
Province of Central Java and Special District of 
Jogyakarta. Provincial Interrogation Team 
.................................... 
Declaration of Oath 
With this I: 
Name ............................. . 
Rank/Number ....... .. .... .. ........ . 
Last employment/function ............... . 
Religion ........................... . 
Last Address ........................ . 
I declare an oath as follows : 
-I swear by Allah: 
1. I shall not engage in activities for the dissemina-
tion/advancement of the views or teachings of Com-
munism/Marxism-Leninism in all its forms and mani-
festations. 
2. I shall not carry out activities in any form what-
ever which · can create disturbances against security 
and order as well as political stability. 
3. I shall not engage in treason against the people and 
state of the Republic of Indonesia which is founded 
on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. 
4. I am at all times prepared to be called by Auth-
ority to be asked for information, and prepared to be 
a witness in trials when needed. 
5. I wholeheartedly accept all actions taken against 
myself which have been carried out by KOP.KAMTI B 
in the framework of the policy of the Government of 
the Republic of Indonesia in the field of ensuring 
security and order as a result of the rebellion/ 
treachery of G30S/PKI and will not prosecute or 
make claims against the Government of the Republic 
of Indonesia. 
6. As a citizen of the state of Indonesia I shall whole-
heartedly serve the Home land and obey all the regu-
lations and stipulations of the laws in force and will 
not allow myself to be used by G30S/PKI and/or 
subversion. 
This is the oath/promise which I state whole-
heartedly and free from any form of duress before 
the authorities as the Representative of the Republic 
of Indonesia and I am responsible for all the conse-
quences of any breach of this oath/promise. 
TAPOL possesses originals of both the8!1111 
llll 
Uother 
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ltA!L AFTER "RELEASE'' 
arta in1tL 
m "~UN Secretary-General, Dr Waldheim, ~ let1~ving his attention to the plight of 
:nsonm. letter together with a number of 
1;r1~~. was published in full in the Dutch 
May, r, 
5. not to give true information to foreign visitors even 
though those visitors have received permission from the 
Government to talk freely with former tapols. 
From the practices described above it may be concluded 
that the status of being returned to society is not equivalent 
to the status of being free in the formal juridical meaning 
of the word . Rather it is equivalent to the status of being 
under town arrest and the words "change of status of de-
tention from full arrest to being returned to society" mean 
"change of status of detention from full arrest to town 
arrest". 
Nobody, including the Government, knows when the 
practices described above, which in reality define the status 
of being returned to society, will end. 
II Because of the Government policy towards tapols several 
fonner tapols will be forced into a life of vagrancy. 
At the time of their arrest, many tapols experienced the 
following fate. 
1. Their families were evicted from their homes which were 
then occupied by a Government official. 
2. Their houses, household effects , hmd, cars, motorcycles, 
as well as their businesses were taken over by officials. 
ORDER FOR CHANGE OF STATUS OF 
DETENTION 
The operative section of this Order reads as follows : 
The Chief Executive Officer of the Operational 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order 
of the .......... Region, 
... ORDERS: 
The chief of General Affairs of the .............. Regional 
Interrogation Team or the Officer charged. 
1. On ..... (date) ...... to change the status of de-
tention of G30S/PKI prisoner: 
Name: ......... . .................. . 
Age: ................... . ........ · .. 
No./Category : ....................... . 
Occupation : ........................ . 
Address: : .......................... . 
from full prisoner to returned to society. 
2. To oblige him/her to obey the decisions contained 
in the Oath/Promise already taken and witnessed 
by a Government official. 
3. He/she is obliged to appear for the purposes of 
interrogation if required. 
_,,..e, as well as other release documents. ,rigillJIJ~ ' . 
SUDOMO ... 
... on Special Treatment for 
G30S/PKI Tapols 
"I don't want this prisoner problem to drag on, 
except for the G30S/PKI prisoners. Apart ffrom the 
G30S/PKI prisoners, all cases are handed over to the 
Attorney-General. These are my instructions and 
everything is now with the Attorney-General who 
must decide." 
After saying that guarantors were required for 
Moslem prisoners to be allowed into house arrest 
before being tried, Sudomo said, again excepting the 
G30S/PKI prisoners, that no one was more interested 
in this than the authorities responsible for law and 
order. "Do you think it is nice having people de-
tained?", he said. {Pelita, 23 April, 1979 .) 
... on Special Identity Cards for 
G30S/PKI Tapols 
Sudomo explained that every former PKI prisoner is 
required to possess a special identity card in order to 
simplify supervision of them. These cards must also 
be registered and deposited with the local Koramil 
(military) authorities or police force . According to 
Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB had instructed every region 
long ago to have special identity cards for PKI 
prisoners who have been returned to society. (Suara 
Karya, 23 May, 1979.) 
In themselves, these actions are agai11st the law and for 
that reason the officials concerned should be arrested and 
brought to trial. But this has not happened. In fact the 
Government has attempted to legalise actions which violate 
the law. This has happened in the following way. 
At the time of release, the authorities hand each tapol 
a document called a statement of pledge which has to be 
recited and signed. It contains among other statements, 
the following: "I wholeheartedly accept all actions taken 
against me by KOPKAMTIB as part of the policy of the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia to restore 
security and order after the G30S/PKI rebellion and I will 
make no claim or charge against the Government of the Re-
public of Indonesia". 
Only a small child could believe that a tapol would 
recite and sign the statement of pledge "wholeheartedly" 
and "voluntarily". Every tapol is convinced that in this 
matter the Government is misusing its authority, but they 
do not protest because they are afraid of the consequences. 
Whether these actions of the Government are legal or not is 
a problem of law. 
In connection with the actions of the Government 
analysed above, after release problems such as the following 
arise for many tapols. 
Firstly, after a ta pol who has lost his home and goods is 
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"released", he is obliged to find accommodation. It is not 
possible for him to be taken in by the people who have 
accommodated his family because the burden on those 
people will be too heavy. 
The Catholic and Protestant churches have given con-
siderable help to former ta pols: accommodation, money, 
capital, clothes, medicines, employment, advice and so on. 
Because they have already been accommodated for more 
than six months, many tapols are requested by the churches 
to find another place because their place will be used by a 
tapol who has just been released. Where will he go? Will he 
take shelter under a bridge with the vagrants? 
Secondly, before and after "release" the Government 
and officials urged tapols to join with the Government in 
the development of the nation . Tapols have already proved 
that they want to work, can work, and are creative. This 
has been proved in the prisons and on Bum. On Bum they 
transformed the jungle into farmland and in the prisons 
they made carvings, violins, guitars and other art objects. 
What the officials and the Government offer with the 
right hand is taken away with the left. The Government has 
announced that former tapols are not permitted to join the 
armed forces or work for vital industries. In practice, every 
door to ministries, department, government offices, state 
corporations and state institutions is closed to them. This 
practice is imitated by private companies and agencies 
because they are afraid not to imitate it. If a private 
company or agency dares to take on a tapol, it is asked by 
Government officials to account for itself or else facilities 
received from the Government become difficult to come by 
or are withdrawn. 
All people who want to practice as a doctor or lawyer 
must be able to show a certificate of non-involvement in 
the Movement of 30th September 1965 in order to receive 
permission to open a practice. This door is also closed to 
former tapols. All doors are closed. There remains self-
GUARD AGAINST INF ANT SUBVERSIVES! 
Recently, TAPOL Bulletin (No. 33) drew attention to 
the assertion of the KOPKAMTIB Commander-in-
Chief, Admiral Sudomo, that certificates of non-
involvement in the 1965 coup (surat bebas) have been 
abolished, the catch being that they are only 
abolished for those who were under twelve years old 
at the time of the 1965 coup. His assertion seems to 
have been ignored by the Maritime Academy, which, 
in a recent advertisement for cadets (Kompas, 2 
April, 1979), seems determined to carry Sudomo's 
caution to even rm re ridiculous lengths. Apart from 
the more usual requirements of applicants, including 
a good character reference from the police, the adver-
tisement requires both that the applicants are under 
22 years of age on 1 July, 1979 and that they have a 
surat bebas. In other words, a person who was eight 
years old at the time of the coup is still open to 
suspicion of involvement, and must therefore carry an 
employment-opening a stall for instance. For tapols who 
have lost all their assets this route is also closed. Are there 
any who have not lost their assets? They will have been 
used up by the family while the husband was in prison. 
Conclusion 
Because of the policy of the Government as explained 
above, in the end many former tapols face a life of oppres-
sion and are forced to find shelter under bridges and to seek 
work as their hungry stomach dictates. 
If I raise the problem of the difficulties of former tapols 
in searching for a livelihood, this does not mean that I 
am asking the Government to give former tapols first prio-
rity in obtaining work and second and third priority to the 
millions of unemployed who are not tapols. What I am 
challenging is Government discrimination against former 
ta pols. 
III The right to vote and to stand in general elections 
Every tapol and former tapol has lost the right to vote 
or stand in general elections. This applies even to those 
who, according to their interrogation record, were proved 
not to be members of the PKI or a mass organisation affili-
ated to the PKI and were not involved in the Movement of 
30th September 1965. 
NF oreign Government and Agency assistance for tapols 
Much foreign assistance from abroad is earmarked speci-
fically for tapols, but it has not yet reached tapols and 
former tapols except for assistance channelled through the 
Catholic and Protestant churches. Where did this flow 
become blocked and who is responsible for the blockage? 
These are the principal difficulties faced by former 
tapols every day which must be solved as quickly as 
possible. 
official document which clears the suspicion. 
This contradiction of Sudomo 's statement has 
been noted in a letter to the Editor of Kompas ( 4 
April, 1979), but a reply from Rasyid R.R., from the 
Directorate-General of Sea Communications, Mari-
time Academy (Kompas, 19 April) proved unen-
lightening: he merely asserted that immigration 
authorities require the surat bebas, and therefore 
sea-going cadets must have the certificate in order to 
get their sea-men's passports. The real issue of 
Sudo mo 's credibility was ignored. 
Postscript: TAPOL has been informed recently that 
private enterprises which are recruiting uni¥ersity 
students also require the surat bebas. One foreign oil 
exploration company demanded the certificate from 
applicants undergoing a one-month training course, 
and an Indonesian electronics assembly plant also had 
the same requirement, despite the fact that student 
applicants would be in their early twenties. 
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STUDENTS DEFY 'NORMALISATION' 
'Normalisation', a government euphemism for its ad hoc and 
crude attempts to subdue the student movement without 
direct military intervention, continues to meet with deter-
mined and principled student opposition. 
Students at th.e University of Indonesia (UI) and the 
Bandung Institute of Technology (BIT) have re-established 
their student councils, denouncing the 'normalisation'-
imposed "Co-ordinating Bodies", as substituting a "culture 
of spying" for student democracy (Tempo, 12 May 1979). 
The Rectors of the campuses, who, as reported in 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 32 (February 1979), have been under 
strong government pressure to enforce 'normalisation', 
seem to be vacillating in their responses to student stands, 
and have been unwilling to make statements on the issues 
involved (Tempo, 12 May, 1979). However early in May 
(Tempo, May 12, 1979) the Rector of Ul attempted to 
defuse campus tensions by donating Rp 150,000 towards 
a student function, but his action backfired when students 
af the well-attended function defied the Rector's ban on 
speeches and statements: they publicly criticised 
'normalisation' and called for a return to the 1976 Consti-
tution of the UI Students' Council. In addition, the 
'persona-non-grata' poet, Rendra appeared at the function 
to read his poetry. Immediately afterwards, the Rector 
suspended two of the organisers, Indra Budenani (until the 
end of the year, thus missing his final examinations) and 
Tito Sulistio (until the end of July). In Bandung, Aussie 
Gautama and Wismu Hendradjit, Chairperson and Secretary 
respectively of the newly and defiantly formed Students' 
Council, have been suspended for the 1978-9 academic 
year. (Kompas, 31May,1979). 
The inability of the 'normalisation' apparatus to deal 
with the well-planned and essentially moderate student 
defiance has been underscored with the replacement of the 
BIT Rectorium with a "Provisional Acting Rector", Dr 
Daddy Achdiat Tisnaamidjaja, Director-General for Higher 
Education at the Ministry of Education and Culture, which 
means that the "troublesome" Institute is now placed 
directly under the control of the Ministry. The Secretary 
of the BIT Senate greeted the announcement of this 
appointment with some misgiving, saying that he felt 
"anxiety and uncertainty" (Kompas, 31 May 1979) as the 
nature of the new leadership indicates the "abnormality" 
of BIT as an educational institute. He called upon the 
government to appoint a Rector in conformity with normal 
practice as soon as possible. The outgoing Chairman of the 
BIT Rectorium admitted that he had failed to persuade the 
students to accept 'normalisation', saying, "I hope Pak 
Doddy can do it". About 100 students welcomed the new 
Rector with a condolence wreath, posters and a memo-
randum, urging the BIT leadership to recognise the 
students' desire for democracy on the campus. 
Undaunted by the authorities, representatives from all 
the major student councils- in Jakarta belonging to BKKPT 
(Co-ordination Body for Higher Education Activities in 
Jakarta) met for a seminar entitled, The Form and 
Function of Student Institutions on 21-23 May, 1979, and 
agreed upon the following: 
* the application of 'normalisation is inappropriate to, and 
does not conform with student aspirations. 
* 'Normalisation' contains contradictions in that it fails to 
take into account the differing conditions from one 
campus to another, and has led to anxiety on the 
campuses. 
* 'nt>rmalisation' conflicts with various MPR decisions. 
* university staff are showing a tendency to interfere with 
student activities as a result of pressure by the 
authorities. 
* 'normalisation' is aimed at suppressing student creativity 
and activities. In denying autonomy to student bodies, 
there are indications that it will isolate students from the 
rest of society by undermining the students' concept 
of "service to society". 
* 'normalisation is anti-educative. 
Later, Sinar Harapan (28 May) reported that more than 
30 students from BKSPMI (Co-ordinating Body for Student 
Justice), met with the DPR (parliament) Deputy Chair-
person, Moh. Isnaeni. At the meeting they firmly rejected 
'normalisation' saying that the policy conflicts with student 
aspirations, and that the campuses should be allowed to 
return to the principles expressed in student constitutions 
at university and faculty level. Protesting against the 
present student trials, they also stated that Student 
Councils and not individuals should be on trial as last year's 
student actions and statements which criticised the 
government were not merely the work of individuals, but 
were consistent with the opinions and deeds of the 
councils. 
Student meeting on the University of Indonesia campus, 6 May 
1979, at which 'normalisation' was rejected. (Tempo, 12 May 1979) 
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STATE DEPARTMENT CHALLENGED 
The appearance of the 1979 US State Department Human 
Rights Report has once again confumed the Carter adminis-
tration's consistent refusal to acknowledge the extent of 
Indonesia's human rights violations, although substantial 
documentation of this is readily available. 
Professor Benedict Anderson, a Cornell University 
Indonesia specialist, has taken issue with the report on 
many of its assertions (see TAPOL (US) Bulletin Vol. 18/19 
April/May, 1979). A summary of some points in professor 
Anderson's article is given below as the US administration's 
attitudes on foreign policy issues have a profound effect on 
foreign policy formulations by other western governments. 
Further, the article gives important insights into the nature 
of both the Suharto and the Carter governments. 
Torture 
The State Department claims that ''there is no evidence of 
systematic torture or police brutality", and also cites two 
cases where police officers have been either tried or 
sentenced for mistreatment of prisoners. 
Anderson observes that there is substantial evidence that 
student and Moslem prisoners have been beaten and 
tortured. The student leader, Lukman Hakim, has stated 
that he and fellow students were "brutally interrogated, al-
most all students detained with us experienced beatings, 
electrical torture and isolation cells . For months we were 
confined with other criminals, whose cultural traditions-
beatings and other violence-we did not fail to undergo". 
Further, the State Department falsely suggests that the 
issue of torture centres on the police and their detainees. 
This may be so in the case of (non-political) criminal pri-
soners, but political prisoners are under the control of the 
military, especially the notorious KOPKAMTIB (Command 
for the Restoration of Security and Order) which is under 
direct presidential control and has almost unlimited powers. 
Significantly, this Command receives no mention in the 
entire report. 
Degrading Treatment 
The State Department glosses over this issue by means of 
some remarkable understatements, for example by referring 
to instances of forced labour. 
Anderson replies that Buru island alone has more than 
10,000 political prisoners, most of whom have cleared 
jungle, built the camp and grown their own food in years of 
forced labour. In the last few months the Indonesian press 
has reported that more than 6,000 ex-detainees are being 
used as forced labour on state-owned plantations in North 
Sumatra. 
Arbitrary Arrest or Imprisonment 
The State Department seems to have accepted the estimate 
of the Indonesian government that it has only about 10,000 
political detainees. The report does acknowledge however 
that "Up to 500,000 persons may have been initially de-
tained ... on suspicion of complicity in the attempted 
coup". 
Anderson poses the question, "Can anyone give an example 
of a 500,000 person coup? "Furthermore , he asks why the 
State Department prefers the notoriously unreliable figures 
of the Indonesian government to those prepared by the 
rigorous methods of Amnesty International, which esti-
mates in a report published in October 1978, that there are 
"almost certainly still more than 30,000" political 
detainees. 
The State Department discusses, apparently naively, 
Indonesian efforts to re-integrate the former detainees into 
society. 
Anderson calls attention to the fact that there is no 
mention in the report of the fact that the government has 
taken decisive measures to bar all ex-prisoners from 
employment in many fields , by means of demanding a 
"certificate of non-involvement in the 1965 coup" as a 
condition of employment. This of course is not available to 
ex-prisoners even though most have never been tried, let 
alone found guilty, of involvement. 
The State Department presents the arrests of student and 
Moslem leaders in a rmst misleading way, saying that some 
had been "charged with acts of terrorism" and that 
"student detainees interviewed after their release indicated 
that they had been treated well in prison". 
Anderson recalls that in fact the charges brought against the 
student leaders were extremely arbitrary. In February 
1978, just before the Presidential elections, they were 
charged with 'subversion', but in November, 1978, the 
charges were changed to 'insulting the Head of State', 
presumaqly in response to international opinion. The 
change in charges affected 31 * student leaders in no less 
than six different cities. As to treatment in prison, 
Anderson observes that those who were interviewed had 
most probably been released very shortly after arrest in 
February 1978, whereas the primary cause for concern 
should be those who still remain in detention. 
* * Professor Anderson's comments touch accurately on some 
important issues. More than that they raise the question of 
why the State Department has been wrong in such a range 
of its assertions when information outside of Indonesian 
Government material is so readily available. The reports on 
human rights in individual countries are supposed •·to assist 
Members of Congress in considering legislation in these 
areas" and yet it seems that the legislators are being 
seriously misled. However if the report is merely aimed at 
assuaging the consciences of Congress members who are 
legislating in favour of aid to Indonesia, it is admirably 
performing its function . 
1f TAPOL now has information about the trials of 36 students. 
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PSYCHO-DECEPTION: ENQUIRY ENDS IN 
COVER-UP 
A Commission of Enquiry set up by the Nijmegen Catholic 
University to investigate the role of Dutch psychologists in 
helping to devise the psycho-tests used on political 
prisoners by KOPKAMTIB has announced that it found no 
evidence of their involvement. In fact none other than 
Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB's Commander, had 
revealed earlier that help had been given by Dutch, 
American and British psychologists. (The New York Times 
12 and 26 April, 1978). Following this, there were many 
protests in the Netherlands, particularly Nijmegen where 
the Catholic University has a joint project with Indonesian 
psychological institutes. The protests forced the University 
to set up a Commission of Enquiry. 
But the Commission resulted in nothing more than a 
cover-up. This is dear from revelations by Jan Huurman, a 
student-member of the Commission, which have been made 
public in the Dutch press. From his remarks and from other 
information published in the Haagse Pos, it is clear that all 
Indonesian psychologists who have been assisted and 
advised by Nijmegen psychologists are actively involved in 
the Indonesian Army's Institute of Psychology. They 
include Dr Faud Hassan, ex-Dean of the Bandung Faculty 
of Psychology, who has titular military rank and who super-
vised the compilation of the questionnaire used on the 
tapols, Mrs Saparinah Sadli who worked on the list of ques-
tions after visiting Buru in 1971, Drs Sudirgo Wibowo who 
worked on item-analysis needed for the questionnaire, Mrs 
Yusuf Nusjirwan who undertook an investigation of atti-
tudes of women tapols in Bukit Duri in 1966, Drs R. 
Sumarto, a psychologist also actively involved in preparing 
the test, who is now a brigadier-general in the Army, and 
Professor Ma'rat who, besides being Dean of the Bandung 
Faculty of Psychology since 1976, works for the Army's 
Psychology Institute in West Java. 
Professor Monks who is in charge of the Nijmegen joint 
project is quoted as saying: "In fact, it is known that all 
(Indonesian) psychologists over the age of forty have taken 
part in formulating the tests for political prisoners. One can 
speak of a tradition of involvement in these tests ... " 
Jan Huurman has pointed out that the terms of 
reference of the Commission - "to discover whether Dutch 
psychologists helped to draw up the questionnaire and 
screen the prisoners" -were so narrowly-defined as to 
ensure a negative answer. Moreover, the Commission was 
required to confine its investigations solely to statements 
from Nijmegen psychologists involved in the project and to 
official documents of the project. 
The test used as the basis for the KOPKAMTIB psycho-
test was the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule devised 
by American psychologists which had been translated by 
Mrs Yusuf Nusjirwan. But adaptations were needed to make 
it usable in Indonesia. The item-analysis required for this 
adaptation was progranuned through the Nijmegen Uni-
versity computer under the supervision of a Dutch 
industrial ·psychologist. Moreover, the fact that the work of 
devising the psycho-test was undertaken by Drs Sumarto 
and Mrs Sadli both of whom have for long been advised and 
assisted by Nijmegen psychologists was completely ignored 
in the Commission's report. 
Jan Huurman. who signed the report himself, stated 
publicly that he thought that since the Commission had 
failed to find evidence of involvement, the University's 
Council would decide that further investigations were 
needed. But the Council hastily called a press conference, 
announced the Commission's findings and declared that the 
matter was now closed. He then realised that his signature 
was being used to legitimise a cover-up and decided to dis-
associate himself from the report. He also warned that 
student representatives on the University Council would 
not allow the matter to rest . 
Sources: Haagse Pos, March and 14 April 1979. 
TAPOL campaigns for the release of Indonesian 
political prisoners and is a humanitarian organ-
isation. It is not associated with any political 
groups, either in Indonesia or abroad, and is 
supported by individuals and organisations of 
many shades of opinion. 
SUBSCRIPTION INCREASE 
Although we have tried to avoid ra1smg our sub-
scription rate, new demands on our limited funds 
have given us no choice. In our last issue we noted 
that our work has expanded, including particularly 
two major research projects, one on East Timor and 
one on the G30S trials and rule of law. This issue of 
T APOL Bulletin is 20 pages, and we predict that 
events in Indonesia will make it likely that we will 
continue to produce larger bulletins. Now we have 
postage and tax increases to add to our expenses. 
The subscription rate is now: 
One Year (six issues) 
UK and Europe £4.50 
Overseas (airmail) £6.00 
The new rate will operate from when existing sub-
scriptions are due, or for any new subscribers. We 
regret having to make the increase, and apologise to 
our readers. 
T APOL is very dependent on donations from 
supporters, and we ask you once again to give what 
you can afford to enable us to continue our work 
without severe financial limitation. 
Please send your donations, large or small, to: 
TAPOL, 8a Treport Street, London SW18 2BP 
(see back page for advice on ways of making 
payments). 
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T APOL TRIALS RESEARCH: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 
TAPOL has so far been able to collect data on the cases of 
366 persons tried in connection with the 1965 coup, and it 
is intended that this material , together with the results of 
additional research, will.be published as a report on the rule 
of law in Indonesia. The information so far obtained varies 
considerably from one case to another, and the 366 cases 
represent only 41% of the officially acknowledged number 
of trials-894 according to President Suharto in March 
1978. However some trends have emerged from the 
material, and they raise some interesting questions. 
Of the 366 cases, 58 (about 16%) received the death 
sentence, and another 58 were sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Another 65 (17.5%) were sentenced to 20 years' 
imprisonment. In other words nearly half (49.5%) of the 
cases received sentences of 20 years and over. Only 8 of all 
the cases known received sentences of less than ten years. 
207 (56.6%) of the cases were tried in military courts, but 
not all of these cases were those of military personnel. Al-
though ordinary military courts tried only military person-
nel, the use of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal 
(Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa-Mahmilub) for the cases of 
prominent civilian as well as military figures has been a 
matter of special interest in the research so far. However, 
although there were a few civilians tried in military courts-
to give some well known examples, Njono, Sudisman and 
Dr Subandrio-there have still been enough purely military 
trials to cast doubt on the government's assertion that the 
30 September Movement was a PKI affair, and this doubt 
is compounde.d by the fad that the harshest sentences were 
given in military courts. 
In December 1963 Pfesident Sukarno in a special Presi-
dential Decree (no. 16/1963) announced the provisions for 
setting up the Mahmilub. The stated aim of the Decree was 
to speed up the "security" trials of people who "constitute 
a serious threat to the security of the People and State 
which is in a process of revolution to establish a socialist 
society of bdonesia". To our knowledge, this court was 
never actually set up or used by Sukarno. In view of the 
fact that the Mahmilub was later used after the 1965 
military takeover, the immense powers vested in the Presi-
dent vis-a-vis the setting up and functioning of the court, 
are worthy of some attention: 
* The court is specifically a military court, and it is 
"entrusted the task of investigating and trying in the 
first and last instance special cases as decided by the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia" (Article l 
-our emphasis) 
* The Mahmilub consists of a Presiding Judge, two or 
more member judges, a Prosecutor and a clerk, all of 
whom must be higher than middle-ranking officers in the 
armed forces. Article 3, paragraph 3 states, 
"The said officers shall be appointed by the President 
on the b'asis of a proposal of the Minister/Commander 
of the Force concerned" (our emphasis) 
* Allowance is ma de for the accused to be assisted by one 
or more defence lawyers and/or advisors, but Article 4, 
paragraph 2 states; 
"If the accused cannot submit a defence lawyer then 
the Presiding Judge shall appoint one or more assis-
tants for him" (our emphasis). 
* The President also has the ultimate control over commit-
tals in that this 
"shall be carried out by the Minister/Commander of 
the Force appointed by the President" (Article 5, 
paragraph l ). 
* The provisions for giving evidence are dubious, as can be 
seen in Article 5, paragraphs 4,5 and 6; 
"4. The presentation of evidence shall follow the laws 
of evidence which are in force for the Supreme court 
of Indonesia; 
5. The written evidence of witnesses, prepared under 
oath and read to the session of the Tribunal, shall be 
of the same value as oral evidence given under oath; 
6. It shall suffice if objects of evidence (exhibits) shall 
be certified by a declaration prepared on oath by a 
competent functionary, containing the type, number, 
place and time of the said exhibits." 
* Again the President has some control over the verdict 
through the Minister /Commander he appoints for the 
committal of the case, as Article 6, paragraphs 1, 2 and 
3 demonstrate , 
"l. Before being announced and implemented, the 
Decision of the Tribunal must first be submitted to 
the Minister/Commander of the Force who submitted 
the case upon which a verdict has been taken, in 
order to obtain approval for its implementation. 
2. If the Minister/Commander refuses to give appro-
val, then the documents of the case together with his 
opinion or reasons for refusal will be sent to the 
Supreme Military Tribunal. 
3. The Supreme Military Tribunal shall sit promptly 
and give its verdict." 
* The Decree states that sentences other than the death 
sentence may not be appealed against , and that the Presi-
dent himself decides whether clemency should be given 
in the case of a death sentence; 
"If a death sentence is passed the implementation can 
only be carried out after the President has taken a 
decision concerning the matter of clemency in the 
case concerned" (Article 7, paragraph 2). 
After the coup of 1965, another Presidential decision, (No. 
370/1965), signed by Sukarno, was issued in which the 
Mahmilub was pressed into the service of Suharto. The new 
decision no longer emphasised that the socialist revolution 
was to be protected, but denounced the events of some two 
months earlier, known as the "30 September Movement" 
(G30S). It recalled the enormous and arbitrary powers 
vested in the President, but since General Suharto then still 
. ' a Ma1or-general, had been appointed as Operational 
Commander in charge of security, the Decision hande'd all 
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MOSLEM DETAINEES RELEASED 
Professor Ismael Suny, Rector of Muhamadiyah University, 
Bung Torno the well-known Moslem politician and Mahbub 
Djunaedi, a journalist and General Secretary of the PPP, the 
Moslem party, were released from detention on 9 April 
after spending exactly one year in detention. 
Two months earlier, 22 Moslem activists who had been 
detained in connection with the "20 March 1978 event" 
were allowed home from prison as "external detainees". 
Other detainees are still being held in connection with the 
incident. 
This 'event' relates to incidents which occurred at a 
hotel where members of the People's Consultative Assem-
bly were staying on the occasion of the Session at which 
Suharto was re-elected President. 
The three Moslem leaders had all been arrested in April 
1978, shortly after this People's Consultative Assembly 
Session. Initially, reports Tempo {14 April, 1979) they 
were held on charges of subversion but later the grounds 
were altered to that of "instigating the students" in 
speeches which they had made at student meetings earlier 
in the year. They were released just in time to keep the 
length of their detention within the one-year maximum 
stipulated by the Anti-Subversion Act. They were all 
granted full release, although they may still be subjected to 
interrogation. 
Mahbub Djunaedi has been in hospital suffering from 
high blood-pressure for most of the year. Professor Suny 
has written three manuscripts, one of which, his memoirs, is 
to be published soon. He also told journalists after his 
release that he would be returning to his university job after 
a short rest. 
The remaining "20 March 1978 event" detainees (whom 
the government refers to as the "Koji" or "Jihad Com-
mand" detainees) can, according to Admiral Sudomo, be 
allowed home on condition that someone will stand 
the Mahmilub powers over to him. 
The Mahmilub in its most critical features is subject to 
the will of the President, or anyone appointed by him and 
this arbitrariness raises two important questions. First there 
are no criteria, apart from the will of the President, which 
determine who should be tried in the Mahmilub. There is 
no definite answer to the question of why some civilians 
and some members of the armed forces (and not others) 
were tried in the Mahmilub. At this stage we can only 
hypothesise that the cases tried in the Mahmilub were those 
which the President wishes to keep under his direct control. 
Secondly it is obvious that this court is outside any normal 
controls which ensure the impartiality of the judiciary. 
How can judges who are the direct appointees of a Presi-
dent dedicated to the vilification of the Communist Party, 
possibly decide impartially the cases of those who are 
accused of being involved in an allegedly Communist-
inspired col!p? This question makes even more terrible the 
fact that of known Mahmilub sentences , 75% have been the 
death sentence. 
guarantor. This, he said, was in conformity with the joint 
decision announced by leading law-enforcement officers 
last November which permits persons to be remanded on 
bail pending trial. 
The treatment of these detainees contrasts sharply with 
that of G30S/PKI detainees, for whom the provisions of the 
Anti-Subversion Act and other regulations simply do not 
apply. In fact, when explaining that the "koji" detainees 
could be allowed home pending trial, Sudomo explicitly 
excluded G30S/PKI detainees from such treatment. (See 
page 11). 
15-Year Sentence 
Amir Huta Fauzi, a Moslem detainee was tried by Sidoarjo 
District Court in January this year and was given a sentence 
of 15 years with deduction for time spent in detention. He 
was charged with subversion, undermining the State ideo-
logy and sabotaging the 1977 general elections. Other trials 
of Moslem detainees are reported to have been held in East 
Java, Central Java and North Sumatra and are believed to 
be connected with Moslem party campaigning during the 
1977 elections. 
continued from p. 8 
Ismail Gazali A student at the Institute of Paedagogy, 
Malang, East Java. No details have been received about his 
trial. {Stop Press: He got 15 months.) 
Harun al Rasyid Chairman of the Student Council of the 
Surabaya Institute of Technology. He is being held in 
custody during the trial. 
Ujung Pandang 
"A. D."l Chairman of the Institute of Paedagogy, Ujung 
Pandang, South Sulawesi. 
Palambang, South Sumatra 
Cholib bin Nangnur He is Chairman of the Student Council 
of the Sriwijaya University, Palembang. 
Achmad Damiri First Deputy-Chairman of the Student 
Council of the Sriwijaya University. 
Yoilas Rafli Fourth Deputy-Chairman of the Student 
Council of the Sriwijaya University. 
Medan, North Sumatra 
Drs. Irwan Bachrum, Yose Rizal Nasution, Fauzi Yusuf 
Hasibuan and Chatib Usman are included on the original 
list of defendants received by T APOL. The only press 
report of a Medan trial states that the Chairman the 
General Secretary and an ex-member of the St~dent 
Council of the University of North Sumatra are on trial, but 
names were not given. 
Jogjakarta, Central Java 
Maqdir Ismail He is identified only as a student at the Isla-
mic University of Indonesia, in Jogjakarta. He arrived ten 
minutes late for the first hearing, having been delayed by 
one of his defence lawyers. Because of this, the judge 
ordered him to be placed into custody . 
1. Newspapers are required to identify the defendants only by their 
initials. The list TAPOL has received has enabled us to identify most 
of the students, but we have been unable to identify this person. 
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IGGI AID: BEHIND THE MASK OF DEVELOPMENT 
Indonesia's third Five Year Development Plan, Repelita III, 
was ushered in on 1 April, only a few days before the IGGI 
(Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia) consortium 
pledged its support of the Plan with immense financial 
backing. At the annual IGGI meeting in Amsterdam on 3-5 
April this year, the group , which includes Britain, promised 
"supplemental development" aid of USS2.77 billion for 
1979-80 (42.4% of Indonesia's development budget), of 
which Sl.9 billion is to be on "'soft ' terms, and the rest at 
commercial borrowing rates. 
The meeting's press communique revealed little of the 
daunting economic and social problems in Indonesia, 
beyond of course the questions which might be asked about 
the sheer magnitude of the loan and its apparently generous 
terms. The Indonesian delegation discussed the Plan in op-
timistic terms, stating that its aim is to "raise the standard 
of living of the Indonesian people" with objectives of 
",equity, growth and stability in that order". Although the 
communique suggests that the IGGI countries are com-
pletely oblivious to Indonesia's serious economic and poli-
tical issues, a confidential World Bank report distributed at 
the meeting did in fact discuss some of these issues, but it 
formulated an economic policy which makes the stated 
aims of Repelita III impossible to achieve, and in fact goes 
hand-in-hand with the political repression for which 
Suharto's Indonesia is well known. 
The Political Economy of Repression 
Oil 
The oil' industry can no longer be relied upon to mask the 
vast problems of economic stagnation, which until now 
have been partially hidden from superficial international 
scrutiny behind impressive GNP figures prestigious 
buildings and a few ambitious industrial and infrastructural 
projects. Overexploitation of oil in the past has led to a 
situation where the Indonesian production of 1.6 million 
barrels a day (accounting for nearly 67% of foreign ex-
change earnings) is offset by imports of nearly 350,000 
barrels per day of crude oil from the Middle East for a 
domestic consumption where oil accounts for 90% of com-
mercial energy consumption. With a current decline in pro 
duction and exploration, and an estimated reserve of only 
13 billion barrels, Indonesia could well become a net im-
porter of oil by the late 1980s. 
At the height of the oil boom earlier this decade, oil 
revenues were not used to strengthen the agriculural sector , 
nor to stimulate any broad-based development, which 
might have alleviated present problems. On the contrary, 
the 'oil General' lbnu Sutowo , ran Pertamina the state oil 
company, into a debt of USSlO .5 billion. Ironically, Indo-
nesia must now increase its oil production over the next 
five years in order to buy the time for a diversification of 
energy resources. Yet the current . president-director of 
Pertamina, Piet Haryono has just said that Pertamina will 
need USSl 7 .6 billion over the next five years just to main-
tain present production levels. Already Indonesia has a 
staggering external debt of USSl 9 .5 billion with a debt 
servicing ratio near the "danger" level of 20%. 
The domestic repercussions of this, aggravated by World 
Bank inspired policies, are explosive. The World Bank 
attacked the Indonesian budgetary subsidies on domestic 
fuel consumption as unnecessarily draining the meagre 
public sector resources, and pressured for a 40% increase in 
all domestic fuel prices with a 20% annual increase. Having 
an extremely dependent economy, Indonesia responded 
predictably, and on the last day of the IGGI conference, 
Mining and Energy Minister, Subroto, announced the stipu-
lated price increases with the exception of kerosene. Al-
though the exception tempprarily buffers the impact of this 
draconian measure, kerosene prices must rise, as 25% of 
Indonesia's kerosene is imported. The impact of the rises is 
bound to be drastic. Only 1.1 % of the population has access 
to domestic electricity , and now that Java's forests are 
denuded, the rest of the population largely depends on 
kerosene for fuel. 
Agriculture 
Despite claims of increased rice production, Indonesia 
imported 2 .3 million tons of rice in 1977, accounting for 
over a quarter of the world market. Although rice imports 
Robert McNamara, on a visit to 
Indonesia in May 1979, made a 
point of showing interest in the 
peasants. (Tempo, 19 May 1979) 
By the end of the current finan-
cial year, Indonesia's debt to the 
World Bank will total 2.5 billion 
dollars, making it the Bank's 
fourth largest debtor. 
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have now dropped to an expected 1.3 million tons for this 
year, they are expected to rise to 2 .5 million tons by 1985. 
The World Bank has recommended an increase in consumer 
prices, hoping to encourage secondary crop production. 
Given the fact that over half of Java's huge population are 
landless, this is a harsh measure, and more will be forced 
to the margins of subsistence with a diet of cassava and 
even the pig fodder, water hyacinth. For some years 
authoritative social scientists working in Java have 
expressed serious concern about the massive displacement 
of labour from agriculture by mechanised farming and pro-
cessing. Yet the World Bank has promoted this policy. The 
key to this heartless conundrum lies in another aspect of 
World Bank strategy-one in which unemployment is a 
structural imperative. 
Export-Oriented Industrialisation 
The treatment of a labour pool (or reserves of unemployed 
labourers) as a resource says volumes about World Bank 
thinking, 
"Indonesia has the largest remaining pool of inexpensive 
and relatively literate labour in Southeast Asia. Even 
before the recent devaluation, wages for unskilled labour 
were amongst the lowest in the world; lower than in 
Singapore, Hongkong, South Korea and Taiwan. Labour 
is not unionised and government has ·largely refrained 
from intervening in the labour market." 
This is the crux of a shift in policy from import substitu-
tion, which has been unsuccessful in countries where 
poverty has not allowed the creation of a booming market, 
to "Export Oriented Industrialisation" (EOI). The Suharto 
government has agreed in principle to the strategy and has 
already laid the ground work, with devaluation, increased 
fuel prices, and new. and appealing tax measures for foreign 
investors. 
EOI is a form of enclave development where export pro-
cessing zones are established as bases in which foreign com-
panies benefit from cheap labour, extraterritorial privileges, 
customs freedoms, preferential taxes, low cost utilities and 
repatriation of profits. Often national capital provides the 
infrastructure. These zones function simply as individual 
cogs in the assembly phase of a global manufacturing and 
marketing process. While EOI demands that third world 
enclaves take on the organisational features of highly in-
dustrialised countries, the resemblance ceases here. Produc-
tion is confined to artificially-created, small and isolated 
enclaves. There is no integration of the economy, few link-
ages and an inevitable neglect of other sectors. EOI is 
merely an implantation of industrial techniques, capital 
equipment and management skills in selected areas, not 
industrialisation as such. This option in fact obviates the 
need for recipient governments to tackle an entire system 
of inefficiency where smooth running can be assured by 
imported managers. Rising labour costs in former favoured 
EOI zone sites, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong-
kong have focused attention on Indonesia and such aptly-
dubbed "giant dwarves" are produced by the World Bank as 
an example of what Indonesia might aspire to. 
Consistent with demands for the withdrawal of budget-
ary subsidies, the World Bank has noted that "a massive 
increase in the level of private investment and a shift in the 
balance between private and public sector investment 
toward the former is needed. Private investment must come 
from overseas, but it usually takes the form of capital 
equipment, rather than capital. The shift makes it virtually 
impossible to attend to vital social needs, despite the lofty 
ideals of Repelita III. Furthermore the EOI strategy mili-
tates against the establishment of small and medium-sized 
national industries, whatever the IGGI rhetoric may be. The 
Bank puts it quite delicately, 
" ... it may be preferable to aim in particular at the 
establishment of medium-sized and large units to econo-
mise on scarce managerial skills, to facilitate access to 
foreign technology and to achieve effective quality 
control which is so vital to external market 
penetration." 
In reality, tariff, taxation, public expenditure and pricing 
measures required by small national companies are quite 
contrary to the interests of the EOI strategy. 
Political Implications 
As a relatively new and only partially implemented policy, 
the switch in emphasis to EOI has already produced several 
signs of the potential for unrest implicit in the policy. The 
government can only respond with increasingly severe 
crackdowns as 'stability' is a precondition for EOI 'develop-
ment'. In terms of the provision of basic needs for the 
masses, the outlook is bleak. For the employed labour 
force, the iron law is that wages must be kevt to a sub-
sistence minimum, entailing the banning or government 
control of unions, oppressive anti-strike action and the 
denial of effective mechanisms for labour-management 
relations or grievance procedures. National entrepreneurs 
will find the measures discriminatory, students have already 
protested about devaluation and rising fuel costs, and they 
have a long record of criticism of foreign economic control. 
Meanwhile, attempts to create a consumer society with a 
barrage of press, radio and television exhortations, mock 
the declining living standards of the majority. 
The IGGI communique indicated that a "strengthening 
of organisational capacity" is required. This euphemism 
means a consolidation of military-bureaucratic power, in 
which the small technocratic elite will tighten its grip on 
the allocation of goods, services, capital, infrastructure and 
of course privilege. The system cannot tolerate protest, not 
even the existence of alternative views, and political 
imprisonment and other forms of repre~ion may be 
expecte to continue unabated. The logical corollary is that 
there will be increased military spending on imported mili-
tary hardware as a means of subduing a population whose 
needs and livelihoods ar~ irrelevant to a 'development' 
strategy which is supposed to be in their favour. 
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EASTTIMOR 
Professor Noam Chomsky , the well-known American 
linguist and human rights activist , has stated in Lisbon that 
between 100,000 and 200,000 East Timorese have been 
killed either directly or through starvation and epidemics 
induced by defoliants and insecticides, since the Indonesian 
invasion in late 1975. Noam Chomsky was speaking at an 
International Conference on East Timar on May 20 to an 
audience of about 800 people . The Conference delegates 
came from 17 countries and speakers and guests Mr Ken 
Fry (Austrialian labour Party Member of the House of 
Representatives), Mr Mats Hellstrom (Swedish Social Demo-
cratic Party), Mr Louis Jonet (International League for 
Peoples' Rights), Mr Carlos Candal (Portuguese Socialist 
Party), Mr Angelo Correia (Portuguese Social Democratic 
Party), and ambassadors from former Portuguese colonies 
in Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Guine-Bissau. Two 
days after the conference , the Portuguese parliament unani-
mously condemned Indonesian aggression in East Timar. 
Recent press reports and information revealed at the 
Lisbon conference have shown that Indonesian brutality 
continues unabated in East Timar and that the fighting is 
by no means over , despite Indonesian claims to the 
contrary : 
* A recent report in Kompas (23 April 1979) covering a 
visit of Defense Minister General Jusuf to East Timar, 
spoke of the front "particularly at Ostico, Reme:xico 
and Fatubessi". 
* East Timorese sources (quoting recent news) say that at 
least 6-7 corpses of Indonesian soldiers are being flown 
into Dili every day. 
* East Timo rese sources say that since late 197 8 helicop-
ters have been used to transport Indonesian troops and 
heavy artillery into mountain areas. formerly FRETILil'f' 
strongholds, causing many people to flee. These people 
are later transformed in Indonesian press statements, to 
"refugees from FRETILLIN' '. Conditions in the so-
called refugee camps are extremely bad, and the death 
rate is high. 
* Another source has stated that 13 people including 4 
high school students were executed outside Dill very 
recently . 
* East Timor News (No. 55, May 31, 1979) reports that in 
march this year, Alarico Fernandes, the former FRETI-
LIN Information Secretary, along wih Afonso Redentor, 
Cornelio Esposto and Leopoldo, was summarily execu-
ted just outside of Dill. The news service observes that 
the executions are part of an Indonesian plan to exe-
cute all supporters of FRETILIN who have surrendered. 
* On 6 May 1979 ,the Australian Broadcasting Commission 
reported that over 100,000 Indonesians living in the 
eastern islands near Timar are starving following the 
failure of the rice crop. The Governor of Eastern Indo-
nesia apparently only learnt of the famine in the news-
papers, as reports from local officials had either not been 
written or had failed to reach him. If so many Indo-
nesians are starving in the region, it is difficult to 
imagine how East Timor might benefit from integration 
with Indonesia , although this is a key argument of the 
Suharto regime and its supporters who have recognised 
Indonesia's claims . 
HOSTILE RECEPTION FOR SUHARTO IN PNG 
Tight security precautions were a feature of Suharto's 
visit to Papua New Guinea earlier this month, as the PNG 
government has for some time been troubled by strong 
domestic protests about its attitude towards Indonesia, 
particularly its policy of returning refugees from West lrian 
to Indonesian officials. Suharto travelled in a bullet-proof 
Mercedes-which had been specially lent by the Australian 
government to the PNG government for the visit , heli-
copters kept watch above the motorcade, and hundreds of 
police lined the road. 
Although several thousand lined the roads to see 
Suharto, the crowds were not welcoming and students 
staged a vigorous protest against the visit and against Indo-
nesian presence in West lrian. One placard read, "Get out of 
the land our our brothers'', and the students unfurled two 
huge Free Papua flags as Suharto drove past {Adelaide 
Advertiser, 5 and 6 June 1979). Students also denounced 
Indonesian aggression in East Timor. After the procession 
was over, Port Moresby was festooned with anti-Indonesian 
posters and placards. 
In the wake of the visit , the former PNG High Commis-
sioner to Australia, Mr Vincent Eri, denounced the PNG 
foreign policy of "universalism", and was particularly 
critical of the government's dealings with Indonesia 
(Adelaide Advertiser 7 June 1979). He said that the time 
has come for PNG to declare a positive policy of 
international alignment. 
There is considerable anxiety in PNG about possible 
Indonesian expansionism, and a strong anti-Indonesian 
sentiment because of Indonesian treatment of the Mela-
nesian people of West Irian. Also it is well-known in PNG 
that Indonesia is capable of exerting great pressure on the 
PNG government, and the Australian government is an un-
reliable ally with its own policy of appeasement towards 
Indonesia. 
NOTES TO READERS 
To all Subscribers Outside the UK: 
You are kindly requested to pay your subscription by a 
cheque drawn on a London bank or by a mail payment order. 
Some European countries have National Giro arrangements 
which are also very suitable and efficient. 
When we receive cheques drawn on foreign banks, bank 
charges are deducted which reduces the value of a small-
denomination cheque by as much as 35%. To subscribers 
particularly in the USA, we would ask that if you find it' 
more convenient to send us cheques drawn on your own 
bank, you would help us by adding £1.50 to the value of 
your cheque. 
Thank you. 
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